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Resumo
O crescimento explosivo da Internet esta´ a acelerar a migrac¸a˜o das infraestruturas
sociais essenciais do mundo real para o mundo virtual. A gesta˜o de identidade tem
desempenhado um servic¸o fundamental neste processo, tornando mais fa´cil planear,
distribuir e proteger o acesso online. Recentemente o desenvolvimento em modelos de
gesta˜o de identidade estruturados a` volta de conceitos centrados no utilizador tem sido
foco de atenc¸a˜o. Este processo esta´ assim de acordo com a exigente sociedade digital
e empoderamento do utilizador com ferramentas digitais que permitem uma gesta˜o
da identidade digital centrada no utilizador de uma forma mais fia´vel, responsa´vel e
segura. Incidentes recentes ligados com a divulgac¸a˜o na˜o autorizada de informac¸a˜o
sens´ıvel, mostram o qua˜o importante e´ para o utilizador conseguir exercer algum
controlo sobre aquilo que sobre ele e´ publicamente conhecido e disseminado na Internet.
Deste modo e´ imperativo promover o desenvolvimento de sistemas interopera´veis
padronizados que permitam uma gesta˜o focada no utilizador de informac¸a˜o privada e
ajudar a proteger os direitos fundamentais de privacidade do utilizador.
Fornecedores de identidade tal como Google e Facebook, esta˜o atualmente numa feroz
competic¸a˜o por utilizadores. Um dos seus principais objetivos e´ a criac¸a˜o de enormes e
monopolizadas bases de dados pessoais, permitindo a produc¸a˜o de perfis de utilizadores
altamente precisos que podem ser monetizados eficientemente para fins de marketing
e ”lock-in”. Alguns tipos de dados pela sua natureza podem ser sujeitos a constantes
mudanc¸as ficando assim facilmente desatualizados. Com um gestor de identidade
centralizado e ”distante”, pode tornar-se dif´ıcil gerir o grau de atualizac¸a˜o para esses
dados pessoais dinaˆmicos. Por todas estas razo˜es, acreditamos que toda a informac¸a˜o
privada do utilizador deve ser mantida o mais pro´ximo poss´ıvel da fonte prima´ria do
seu proprieta´rio e sobre seu controlo direto. Estes dados podem enta˜o ser geridos pelo
utilizador com a ajuda de entidades conhecidas como Autoridade de Atributos (At-
tribute Authority - AA) pessoais na rede. Estes AAs partilham dados pessoais a outras
aplicac¸o˜es apenas depois do consentimento expl´ıcito do proprieta´rio que deve ter em
ix
considerac¸a˜o a identidade do Provedor de Servic¸os (Service Provider/Relying Party).
Este consentimento deve assumir a forma de autorizac¸a˜o condicional, temporalmente
limitada e facilmente revoga´vel. Estas condic¸o˜es sa˜o essenciais para a gesta˜o focada
no utilizador, que constitui a base da nossa proposta para desenvolvimento de um
modelo totalmente descentralizado, focado na privacidade e no utilizador para gesta˜o
de identidade baseado na agregac¸a˜o de dados privados distribu´ıdos e protegidos por
um conjunto de AAs pessoais.
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Abstract
The explosive growth of the Internet is accelerating the translation of essential real
world societal infrastructures to the virtual world. Identity management has been
playing a fundamental structuring service role in this process, by making it easier
to plan, deploy and secure online access to an ever increasing number of systems and
applications. More recently, the general tendency has been to concentrate development
efforts on identity management models structured around user-centric concepts, totally
in concert with a digital society that is demanding and is ever more focused on em-
powering individuals with tools for a more reliable, responsible and secure user-centric
management of private digital data. Recent incidents related with the unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive information also shows how important it is for users to be able
to exercise some control on how much about them is publicly known and disseminated
on the Internet. It is therefore crucial to promote the development of standardised
interoperable systems that enable the user-centric management of private information
and help secure users basic right for privacy.
Massive centralized identity providers (Google, Facebook), are currently under a fierce
competition over the hearts and minds of users. One of their main purposes is to
create enormous monopolized user personal data database as they enable them to
produce highly accurate user profiles that they can then monetize very efficiently for
marketing and lock-in purposes. There are also some types of important personal
data that by their very nature can be subjected to change and thus become stale,
sometimes very quickly. With a centralized and distant identity provider it can
therefore become quite difficult to manage the degree of staleness for dynamic personal
data. For all these reasons we believe that all users private information should be
kept as much as close as possible to their owners primary source, under his direct
control. This data can then be managed by the user with the help of personal
Attribute Authority(AA) entities in the network. These AAs disclose personal data to
other applications only after the owners explicit consent, which should also take into
xi
consideration the identity of the original requester at the Service Provider/Relying
Party (SP/RP). These consents should also take the form of conditional, temporal
limited and easily revocable authorizations. These essential general assumptions for
user-centric management of private data constitute the base for our proposal on
the development of a fully decentralized privacy and user-centric model for identity
management based on the aggregation of users private data, distributed and protected
by a set of personal AAs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is a massive privacy problem on the Internet that needs to be solved in a
more meaningful and user centric way. The problem lies not only on the lack of
trust but also on how users can effectively regain control by exercising privacy rights
[1] in a more meaningful way. There are many users that spend a very significant
part of their lives online, thus creating and many times unconsciously contributing
with enormous quantities of personal data to less scrupulous service providers, which
can then easily become as individually traceable as the user’s own biological DNA.
And like the DNA, this data can be used, and it is in fact been abused by service
providers, to track and store private personal information that users usually would
not want to have publicized. Controlling our own data and ensure its privacy is
the only way to secure and at the same time maintain the intrinsic value of our
personal information preventing it from being trivialized, exploited or shared without
our consent or have a rightful share of the profits associated with the exploitation of its
value. It is thus vitally important to determine and set a hard limit on what should be
deemed acceptable service provider behaviour and what constitutes a flagrant violation
of our constitutional rights, after all it is our own digital personal data that is at stake.
All this is happening right under our noses. The massive growth of the Internet is being
fed by an ever increasing set of apparently free online services that are being sustained
by the still highly unregulated mercantilization of the users personal data. Remember
that when a popular Internet service is ”free” and it is not trying to sell you anything
it generally means that it is the user that is the product being sold. Traditionally,
many web sites require the user to disclose hitherto unnecessary sensitive identity
information, like postal addresses, telephone numbers, gender, credit cards, geographic
location and even otherwise highly sensitive personal data like for example health
1
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records (Google Health, Microsoft Healhtvault) in order to provide an apparent ”free”
service. In essence these services are definitely not free and constitute a means by
which the user is being mercantilized by the service provider. As an example consider
the current fierce competition being fought off by Google and Facebook about digital
identity services. This has led to the development of massive identity infrastructures
that accelerated the deployment of efficient and easily deployable identity and access
control protocols like OpenID [2] and OAuth [3] to better cater the needs of the service
providers web applications. Unbeknownst to users they are currently being played as
pawns in a very complex scenario that they do not fully understand, where the real
value of their identity attributes is not disclosed and where their identity and privacy
is constantly being negotiated between a set of internet services, without their consent
or opportunity for control [4].
In order to better contextualize and understand the relevant real issues behind this
problem we have conducted an highly comprehensive research and analysis of the
published literature on identity management, user centric access control mechanisms
and identity attributes aggregation and management models. This led to the devel-
opment of a novel user centric framework architecture for identity attributes ag-
gregation (OFELIA - Open Federated Environment for the Leveraging of Identity
and Authentication) that has been designed right from the start to cater with the
problems related with the service providers abuse of confidence over matters related
with digital identity management. Our architecture defines an innovative user centric
authorization/authentication mechanism that protects users’ privacy by the means of
novel discretionary access control mechanisms, that are managed and exercised by
the means of mobile devices, more specifically the users smartphones. The smart-
phone nowadays provides tremendous opportunities because it can also be seen as
a truly personal platform for sensoring the users surrounding environment. They
are provided with cameras, microphone, gyroscope, GPS and a plethora of other
sensoring equipment that can be connected via bluetooth, like for example the cardiac
rhythmic sensors that are nowadays so popular within the jogging community. To
cater with this so much richer universe of highly dynamic personal data, with OFELIA
we have also expanded the set of static identity attributes, being currently managed
by standard Internet identity management systems [5, 6], with a new set of highly
changeable identity attributes. This opens a whole new range of opportunities and
possibilities by having real time dynamic personal data being Processed As Requested
(PaR). In other words, every time a Relying Party (RP) or Service Provider (SP)
requests a dynamic mutable identity attribute, data retrieval occurs in real time and
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goes as deep as its authoritative origin. This new digital identity paradigm is useful
in contexts where identity attributes are highly volatile, because of its high rate of
change, where PaR becomes mandatory if the service provider objective is to keep
a coherent timeline for the identity attributes being thus retrieved. This is easily
illustrated with for example GPS positioning. If we consider applications where this is
an identity attribute (the users current location), in situations where the users are in
constant movement, the more recent the value for this attribute is the more valuable is
for the service provider. For example service providers (relying parties) would be very
keen to serve high value banner advertisements based on the user current user’s GPS
positioning. The more current, the more valuable the advertisement would be. This
can only happen within a PaR paradigm where the Relying Party is provided with
a digital identity infrastructure where it can obtain the real current time positioning
of an individual and not the last time the user or application remembered to update
it. This of course opens a new Pandora Box of privacy violation and surveillance
nightmares that can only be coped if user is given full control over who can access,
for how much time and on what conditions can this highly dynamic real time data be
retrieved from the source by the service providers.
1.1 Motivation
After graduating in Computer Engineering Sciences at faculty of Sciences of University
of Porto, the author started his master degree in Network and Information Systems
Engineering following the Communication Networks minor at the same institution of
his graduation. The first year of his master degree amplified the authors’ interest in
computer security, leading the author to develop a special taste over the complexity
of digital identity management.
During the second year the author joined the OFELIA (Open Federated Environment
Leveraging Identity and Authorization, ref. PTDC/EIA-EIA/104328/2008) project,
that acted as the main motivation source for this thesis. This work was funded by
the ERDF through the Programme COMPETE and by the Portuguese Government
through FCT - Foundation for Science and Technology. The main institutions behind
the project are the faculty of science (CRACS research unit an INESC TEC associate),
faculty of medicine (CINTESIS research unit) both from the University of Porto, the
University of Minho and the Portugal OpenID foundation. The purpose of this project
is to research the conceptualization and implementation of new ideas and extensions
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for user centric identity management and authorization mechanisms for the Internet,
where sensitive identity attributes can be directly stored on the users personal mobile
devices or other user controlled secure storage services on the Internet, whose location
can be hidden from the service providers to enhance and protect users privacy.
Our first identity management framework model, implemented by the author for
the OFELIA project, allowed users to asynchronously control and effectively share
sensitive dynamic identity attributes directly held on mobile devices (in this case
android smartphones) [7]. This initial model served as the starting point for the
rather more complex process of effectively decoupling the storage of identity attributes
from the mobile phone, and it is this rather more complex identity management
infrastructure that is described in this thesis.
1.2 Proposed Solution
We have developed an identity/access control model that aims the development of
standardised interoperable systems that enable the user-centric management of private
information by the usage of smartphones. This model establish the right means
to the users to guarantee the basic right for privacy over their valuable identity
attributes. The adoption of smartphones as a user-centric management platform is
highly appropriate because these devices are nowadays ubiquitous, have more then
adequate processing CPU power to run modern operating systems, are being deployed
with full Internet access, are accompanied by fully matured development systems and
constantly follow their owners everywhere as the ”de facto” personal mobile device.
Therefore providing a practical solution for the users Internet reachability challenge
[8]. The use of smartphones for identity management is currently also recognized as
essential for enhancing security and privacy [9, 10, 11] and has been proved to play
a crucial role on more flexible user-centric models [12, 13]. Based on these facts, the
proposed architecture adopt the use of smartphones as an Authorization Broker in
order to grant users a dynamic and more active role over their identity attributes.
The proposed architecture has been divided in four different components: (1) one
application programming interface (API) in order to establish a fast deployment of
the architecture for the relying parties and service providers; (2) other API for the At-
tribute Authorities (AAs) creating the necessary security means to allow data access;
(3) an implementation of an identity broker based on the linking service aggregation
model referred on section 2.2.6; (4) and an android application, implementing the
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secure mobile authorization broker to aggregate AAs and authorize, manage and
revoke access to their identity attributes over the different AAs.
1.2.1 Objectives
The main goals of this thesis is to define and implement a user-centric distributed
architecture for identity management by the means of mobile devices. We have
identified and proposed the following main objectives:
• Research of the current state of the art on identity management and attribute
aggregation.
• Definition of an architecture that creates an authentication/authorization mech-
anism to protect users privacy by using the research results.
• Implementation of the defined architecture that can be used to fulfill one of
the main goals of the OFELIA project.
• Deployment of the implemented architecture in real scenarios in order to
analysis the architecture performance and usage.
• Dissemination of the results on identity management and access control related
symposiums and international conferences in order to diffuse our results thus
enriching our research.
1.2.2 Features
The main features of the proposed architecture are:
• Attribute Aggregation - Establish the right means for a user aggregate their
personal attributes and at the same time keep in the control over the data
these characteristics are archived by the usage of the identity broker and the
authorization broker.
• User centric model - Personal attributes are only disclosure with previous
user authorization. The owner of personal attributes maintain the capacity to
revoke or limit the access at any time.
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• Dynamic Attributes - These type of attributes are temporal sensitive and
can only reside, not in the cloud, but in mobile personal devices in order to keep
those values up to date creating the necessary temporal stream.
• Easy Integration - The architecture provides two distinct application pro-
gramming interface in order to allow all kind of relying parties and attribute
authorities quickly integrate in the proposed architecture.
• High privacy level - Personal attributes are only disclosure for an authorized
requester. Despite the fact that every personal attribute pass through the
identity broker the data exchanged is always encrypt by the requester certificate
and sign by the data attribute authority.
• Decentralized solution - The Users’ digital information are fragmented through
various attribute authorities, decreasing the chance of success attacks in order
to obtain a user full digital information.
1.2.3 Applications
In the course of our work we have developed several applications to further illustrate
and explore the attribute aggregation architecture for user centric identity manage-
ment that is the objective of this thesis. They are:
1. A mobile application: that implements a secure mobile authorization broker
to aggregate attribute authorities and authorize, manage and revoke access
to their identity attributes allowing the user to asynchronously exercise dis-
cretionary access control over its identity attributes in a simple and highly
transparent way.
2. An application programming interface for relying parties: in order to
establish a fast deployment of our proposed architecture in the most diverse
types of relying parties.
3. An application programming interface for attribute authorities: in
order to create the necessary security means to allow data access.
4. A standalone application: that implements a secure attribute authorities.
This application was developed in Java language in order to provide system
portability.
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5. Identity Broker: a web service that acts as an identity proxy, based on the
linking service aggregation model.
6. A QR Registration plugin application: in order to establish a fast account
creation between the mobile device and XMPP server.
1.3 Application Domain
Identity management system has became an essential tool for economical evolution
on almost every sector. This section further explores some sectors that show great
potential for the deployment of our proposed architecture.
1.3.1 Identity Management
The interest on user digital identity has been increasing dramatically over the recent
years due to the discovery of its highly strategic commercial value for the market
[14]. Massive centralized identity providers started to flourish, companies like Google,
Facebook and even Microsoft, are currently under a fierce competition over the hearts
and minds of users for their personal data. One of their main purposes is to create
enormous monopolized centralized databases of user identity attributes as they allow
them to produce highly accurate user profiles that they can then monetize very
efficiently for marketing and lock-in purposes [15]. These global companies harvest
and aggregate personal data in such a large scale that, lest it is put under some kind
of control, it will very soon represent a major global threat to personal security and
privacy the like of which the world has never seen.
Due to this competition over digital identity, protocols like OpenID for authentication
and OAuth [16] for authorization started to appear in order to cater the need for
web applications data interoperability creating the necessary means for centralized
identity providers. These protocols are employed as standardized mechanisms to build
single sign-on systems and attribute sharing based on valet keys [17]. More recently a
new open standard named as OpenID Connect [18] is under development, as a single
solution for aggregating both authentication and authorization.
In the middle of this dispute lies the user that usually do not understand where his
identity and privacy is being negotiated between a set of fancy internet services and
sometimes even without his consent or control [4]. This privacy abuse is not the only
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problem, if a centralized identity provider like Google suffers an attack, millions of
highly well detailed personal attributes will be compromised.
In order to struggle against these massive centralized identity providers our proposed
architecture defined that the users private information should be kept as much as close
as possible to their owners primary source, under his direct control and never with a
”trusted” third party like Facebook for instance. This data should be managed by the
user with the help of personal Attribute Authority (AA) entities in the network. These
AAs disclose the personal digital data to Relying parties or Service Providers only
after the data owner authorize it. These authorization take the form of conditional,
temporal limited and easily revocable by the data owners. [7, 13]
1.3.2 eHealth
In the healthcare domain, patients digital data is normally collected into what is called
the Electronic Health Record (EHR). The EHR encompasses many functions that can
include different types of data items such as diagnoses, medications and operations
[19, 20]. The EHR is nowadays indispensable for health institutional purposes and
could be used to empower patients by giving them the necessary information to play
a more active role in their own health and in their families health as well [21].
OFELIA has the potential to change current eHealth practices and business practices
by giving the patients the means by which they can directly manage and exercise
revocable access control to their EHR and thus effectively decide with whom to share
their EHR, be it healthcare professionals or even family members and caring friends
[22].
1.3.2.1 Patients EHR (Access and Control)
Nowadays, patients want to be better informed about their medical conditions and play
a more active role on their own treatments. They usually consult online information
by using search engines to educate themselves about etiology, treatments, and the
prognosis of the medical conditions. Getting access to their medical records would
help the patient to better understand their medical conditions [23]. On this issue
the European Recommendation [24] and American Legislation [25] for protection of
medical data agree that the patient must have access to his/her medical record and
play a major role in the decisions regarding the content and the distribution of his/her
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medical data [26].
Currently, for patients to have access to their medical records they need to write a
request to their custodian healthcare institution and the response delay depends on
their country legislation (e.g. 10 days in Portugal [27], 21 days in England [28] and 30
days in USA [25]). We believe that the latest developments in digital communications
and information technologies should provide the patients a simpler and more secure
way to access their medical records and at the same time provide a better collaboration
and interaction experiences with the healthcare professionals [29].
Unfortunately, by opening up the access to the EHR with inadequate access control
mechanisms and policies carries some substantial risks as illustrated by the grim
statistics observed during the period of 2006 to 2007, where in the USA, over 1.5
million names were exposed during data breaches that occurred in hospitals [30].
One of the most important and complex requirement for eHealth systems [31] is to
keep patients’ information private and secure and that is exactly where our proposed
framework could be framed, acting as the authorization infrastructure that acts as
node between the health institution patient records and the patient
Patient medical records exchange between health institutions is very difficult due to
problems ranging from incompatible platforms and data formats, passing through dif-
ficult to negotiate access policies that are acceptable by all participating Institutions,
to the lack of a common agreed upon identity/authorization federated infrastructure
for both patients and health professionals that would allow them to assume compat-
ible/recognizable roles within each hospital eHealth system. Under this very difficult
scenario, our proposed framework, can again act as the authorization infrastructure
that allows the patient to share their medical information with health professionals
independently of the platform since the health professionals would be accessing the
desired data directly from the data source. This scenario would create a false but
helpful kind of interoperability between health institutions
1.3.3 Physical Security Access
The key is the most used token of all time to give/have access to a house, a car, a
safety box and etc. The most common keys are the house keys and the car keys.
Usually the usage of these keys have several problems like:
• Easily duplicable, most of the keys are easy to copy.
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• Non revocable, once you give it you have to change your lock in order to ”revoke”
the access.
• Its a physical device, if you take it by mistake you can only solve this problem
by returning it or having a copy.
• Not possible to define special conditions in the key usage, in other words its not
possible to set usage polices.
By the usage of the proposed architecture we aim the use of smartphones as master
devices that could be used as a key to start a car or/and open a house. This master
device could also virtually authorize other devices to have access by setting special
policies access like temporal constrains. This scenario would help to overcome the
presented problems of the traditional key usage since the master device could manage
all authorizations by limiting its access and revoking it at any time. Obviously the
usage of mobile devices as keys to physical access will create a set of new issues related
with security, however this issues could also be overcame with research.
1.4 Contributions
This section describes the contributions that were obtained during this research. These
include: articles, book chapters, journals and technical reports that were published or
submitted waiting for approval and as well as the studies and prototypes developed
in this thesis process.
Articles in Journals
• A paper in Computers in Biology and Medicine journal titled as ”A proposal
for a secure patient empowerment architecture” from Elsevier. (submitted and
waiting for approval)
Book Chapters
• A book chapter on the book named ”Innovations in XML Applications and Meta-
data Management: Advancing Technologies”, titled as ”A secure and dynamic
mobile identity wallet authorization architecture based on a XMPP messaging
infrastructure” from IGI Global.
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• A book chapter on the book named ”Architectures and Protocols for Secure
Information Technology”, titled as ”A Mobile Based Attribute Aggregation
Architecture for User-Centric Identity Management” from IGI Global. (accepted
and waiting to be published)
Articles in Conferences
• A paper in International Information Security and Privacy conference (IFIP SEC
2012) titled as ”OFELIA - A Secure Mobile Attribute Aggregation Infrastructure
for User-Centric Identity Management” held in Crete, Greece.
• A paper in Information Technology in Bio- and Medical Informatics conference
(DEXA, ITBAM 2012) titled as ”A Mobile Based Authorization Mechanism for
Patient Managed Role Based Access Control” held in Vienna, Austria.
• A paper in Conferenca Ibrica de Sistemas y Tecnologas de Informacins (CISTI
2012) titled as ”A literature review of security mechanisms employed by mobile
agents” held in Madrid, Spain
• A paper in XML: Aplicaes e Tecnologias Associadas conference (XATA 2011)
titled as ”An XMPP messaging infrastructure for a mobile held security identity
wallet of personal and private dynamic identity attributes”, held in Vila do
Conde, Portugal. (best paper award)
Studies and Prototypes:
• A comprehensive research over identity management models including the ag-
gregation of attributes.
• The designing of a simplified identity semantic language in xml schema.
• The design and development and specifications of a user-centric distributed
infrastructure for identity management by the means of mobile devices.
Technical Reports
• A technical report in Center for Research in Advanced Computing Systems
(CRACS) titled as ”OFELIA: Open Federated Environment for the Leveraging
of Identity and Authorisation”.
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International conferences administrative work
• Member of the organizer committee of the special track on: Security and Privacy
in Healthcare IT in the 26th IEEE International Symposium on Computer-Based
Medical Systems (CBMS2013).
1.5 Outline
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organised as it follows:
Chapter 2 Presents an overview how digital identity is managed by the different
models of identity management systems and how the mainly attributes aggrega-
tion models work. It finishes by explaining the methods to establish and secure
a communication channel.
Chapter 3 Describes the proposed architecture by explaining each node of the pro-
posed architecture and contextualizing with the used technologies and methods.
Chapter 4 Describes in detail the protocol messages exchanged to establish the
connection between the architecture components and describes a usage case
scenario, which can be quite useful to help to better understand the different
components interaction.
Chapter 5 Discusses the presented work and the future directions.
Chapter 2
State of the Art
The explosive growth of the Internet is being supported by the translation of essential
real world societal and monetary infrastructures to the virtual world, where digital
identity plays a central catalyzing role that is accelerating the whole process. A digital
identity can also be seen as being composed by a set of personal data attributes that
in some sense characterizes one of the many roles a real person may assume in the
virtual world when he uses an application. Like in the real world, where different
persons can assume different roles depending on the situation and context, in the
virtual world, digital identity is the process by which one can manage a set of personal
attributes that are appropriate to assume a contextual identity, usually referred as an
identity persona[32]. The association between a persona and a user is achieved by
the means of an authentication process that is managed by an identity management
system [33]. A successful authentication assures that a certain entity as the right
to a certain set of personal credentials that the information systems can then use to
determine the kind of resources that persona has the right to use. In this chapter
we review the identity management models currently accepted and described in the
literature, including identity attribute aggregation models and the necessary security
and communication concepts and technologies necessary to properly understand them.
2.1 Research Methods
The literature review we have conducted to better contextualise the research and
work we have done for this thesis was performed on January 2012, using the IEEE
Xplore, ACM Digital Library and Google Scholar search engines. We have applied the
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following queries:
• ”[ANY FIELD] ((((((((user centric model) AND security) AND privacy) OR
identity management) AND digital identity) OR ) attribute aggregation) OR
Federated model)” in IEEE Xplore
• [ANY FIELD] identity management OR attribute aggregation OR user centric
OR Federated identity management in Google Scholar
• ”[ANY FIELD] ((((((((user centric model) AND security) AND privacy) OR
identity management) AND digital identity) OR ) attribute aggregation) OR
Federated model)” in ACM Digital Library
Due to the high number of results thus obtained we had them filtered by their
abstracts, according to the following inclusion criteria:
1. English as language;
2. Recent articles, less than five years old;
3. Articles with high relevance on the search engines;
4. Well known and highly referenced authors in the field of digital identity man-
agement;
5. A cautiously review of titles, abstracts, keywords and section titles, to exclude
papers with the same or somewhat outdated subjects.
After the analysing the most promising papers/standards texts, their citations were
also reviewed and those that suited the inclusion criteria were also integrated in the
review. The search and full text retrieval of the selected papers was performed in the
following databases:
• Biblioteca do Conhecimento Online (b-on),
• Open Repository at the University of Porto,
• Open Access Scientific Repository of Portugal (RCAAP),
• Google Scholar
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In the end we have selected 26 papers. Due to the advisor recommendation, we have
also included six extra papers, amounting to 32 papers that were fully reviewed to
determine a more accurate and useful context for the work we have done for this
thesis.
2.1.1 Identity management systems
Digital identity is maintained by identity management systems that are systems com-
posed of policies, economic model, business processes and technologies that implement
and manage the personal identity users attributes (personas) needed to establish and
manage access rights to the organization digital resources [34]. Moreover Identity
management systems are also responsible for the digital identity lifecycle manage-
ment within organizations as they provide the infrastructure deployed to validate
and exchange the digital personal data attributes needed to establish and promote
interoperability among different systems in accordance with some set of security and
legal policies. According to Kim Cameron, to be useful, an Identity Managament
System (IdMS), must follow the “seven Laws of Identity” [35]. (see table 2.1) Identity
Table 2.1: The Seven Laws of Identity
Description Comments
One User consent An identity is identified and used
only when the user agrees to it.
Two Limited disclosure The system provides the minimum
identifying information required
for the transaction.
Tree Fewest parties Only relying parties that need to
know receive identifying information.
Four Directional identity Omni-directional versus uni-directional
Five IdMS should work with Designers cannot assume the
a variety of identity feasibility of a universal identity or
technologies, run by the availability of a single
multiple providers. expression of an identity.
Six Human integration High levels of reliability between
the human user and the system
Seven Consistent experience across Similar to the way the web
platforms appears to users
management systems are employed by identity providers [33] that can assume several
distinct models depending on the social and/or financial benefits.
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2.1.2 Traditional model
The term identity management indicates the need to verify the identity of the entity
accessing the system and the negotiation of rights and privileges based on privacy
requirements and identity attribute disclosure associated with that identity. Identity
management architectures could be server-based, client-based, or networked-based.
Most common architectures are proprietary, application driven, and server-based. E.g.
Amazon maintains its own users information, resulting in a silo approach, which is
the most common identity management approach currently employed by the vast
majority of Internet service providers. With this approach the user ends up being
forced to have too many digital identities, each one of them managed by a different
entity and requiring its own resources.
Moreover today’s mainstream identity management in the Internet does not align well
with most users, since it requires too much effort from the users (they have to maintain
a huge collection of user credentials, one for each site they use) and a lot of resources for
service providers (resources allocated specifically for identity management that could
have been easily shared with other service providers lest they employed other more
versatile identity management systems). In addition, a Silo based approach is not
compatible with web services, ad-hoc and mobile computing, and possesses a plethora
of well know limitations and liabilities. (see table 2.2)
Table 2.2: Traditional model limitations
Lim. nr Limitation description
1 Users have to cope with a very large number of different identities and
associated credentials.
2 Users must handle several different types of authentication systems.
3 It is a expensive model since it works as a single non shared service.
4 Lack of standards, resulting in security inconsistencies and lack of inte-
roperability between systems.
5 Lack of interoperability between different systems.
6 Users do not have control over their own privacy.
7 No Federation. Each Identity provider has its own scheme.
8 Relies on physical identity elements.
9 Easy to compromise since an attacker can more easily associate digital
personas to real life identities.
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2.1.3 Federated Model
An Identity federation can be defined as the set of agreements, standards and tech-
nologies that allows a group of distinct administration domains to negotiate the
establishment of a circle of trust [36] where they can then mutually recognise the user
identifiers that are managed and entitlements that are issued by the other federation
members they trust. Within a federation, several identity providers (IdP) can be used
to provide a valid identity to any service domain that falls within the federation and
authentication within the federation is achieved by presenting a valid identifier emitted
and authenticated by an IdP that is trusted by the federation. However each service
domain is still free to differentiate the level of service provided to his own managed
identities from the level of service and resources that are provided to other identities
managed by the other distinct federated administrative domains.
Relying party A Relying party B
Identiﬁer B
Authentication 
credential B
User
Figure 2.1: Federated model example
In a federated identity domain, agreements are established between the participating
members to determine which identity attributes need to be recognised across all the
different participating federated domains. These agreements include well defined
policies and technology standards that allow for the mutual interoperabililty of the
participating federated members. A connection can also be established between the
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different identifiers owned by the same user in different domains thus linking these
identities within the federation. This results in a single virtual identity domain where
a user authenticated by a single identity provider using one of his identifiers, can
be considered to have been identified and authenticated within all the other identity
providers within the federation as well. This can be technically achieved by passing
assertions between service providers. (see figure 2.1)
Sending an assertion does not require the users’ credentials. The acceptance of user
access assertions from one identity provider to another is based on the trust established
by the adherence to the circle of trust common policies. A federation of isolated
identifier domains gives the client the idea that there is in fact a single identifier
domain. The user can still hold separate identifiers for each identity provider, however,
he does not necessarily need to know and manage them all. A single identifier and
credential is sufficient for him to access all services within the federated domain and
this can be used to provide a Single-Sign-On solution for the entire federation.
2.1.3.1 Shibboleth
Shibboleth [37] is a very popular, widely deployed and standardized single sign-
on federated platform for the web. It has been developed in the United Kingdom
by the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) to support federated identity
management across all educational institutions. Shibboleth deploys a wide variety of
standards, like for example the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
for attribute assertions, in order to provide a federated single sign-on environment and
a secure attribute exchange mechanism for web applications.
In shibboleth, access control is based on a set of identity attributes provided by a
trusted identity provider and a set of rules defined by the relying party the user wants
to interact with. If the users’ attributes positively match the relying party’s rules,
access is granted. The basic premise lies on the existence of a circle of trust, where the
federated institutions trust the assertions provided by every member of the federation.
Shibboleth main objective is to have everyone involved in the educational system
(elementary school to higher education) enrolled into a wide circle of trust, in order
to better promote the sharing of online educational resources.
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2.1.4 Centralized Model
In centralised models, there exists a single identity manager that is used by all relying
parties, either exclusively, or in addition to other security domains identity managers.
The concept of single sign-on [6] was introduced by this model in order to create an
integration solution for the still highly popular traditional based applications. There
is only one centralized identity provider that is trusted by all the participating relying
parties to manage the user credentials necessary to gain access to their resources. The
user only needs to authenticate once to gain access to the services provided by the
trusting relying parties. (see figure 2.2)
Figure 2.2: Single sign-on model example
This Single Sign-On scenario is very similar to the previously described federated
identifier scenario, except that no mapping of user identifiers is needed because the
same identifier is being used by every relying party. For example Kerberos based
authentication solutions, where the Kerberos Authentication Server acts as the cen-
tralised identity provider, belongs to this category (Kerberos was described in sub-
section 2.3.1). We now proceed to describe other identity management solutions that
may fall within this category.
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2.1.4.1 OpenID
OpenID is an open standard for identity management and user authentication that
was originally conceived to be deployed on an highly decentralized manner. The idea
was to provide each user with the possibility of deploying his own OpenID identity
provider and thus establish a truly user centric, massively distributed, self assembly
identity infrastructure for the Internet. However it did not work this way. Big Internet
identity providers like for example Google and Facebook started to employ OpenID
as the SSO mechanism to uniform access to their own services. This resulted in the
construction of massive OpenID based identity management systems with hundreds
of millions of users that they then opened up for other relying parties, belonging to
other administrative domains, to use. In practice this ended up transforming OpenID,
the paradigm of decentralization, into a protocol that is nowadays mainly employed
in the Internet to make use of the Identity services provided by Google or Facebook,
in a truly centralized way.
The OpenID protocol [2] allows a user to sign-in into very distinct domains with the
same OpenID identifier (a URL) and at the same time control what subset of his
identity attributes will be disclosed to each one of the relying parties he logins to.
In order for a user to be authenticated with OpenID at a relying party, he starts
by having his browser redirected to his OpenID provider by the relying party, where
he is then authenticated (usually by login/password). If the authentication process
is successful the user is then asked to authorise the OpenID provider to disclose the
identity attributes that are being requested by the relying party, after which the user
is once again redirected to the originating requesting relying party where access is
finally granted.
Unfortunately the full set of standardised and universally recognised identity attributes
for OpenID is unfortunately very small. This decreases the usefulness of the protocol
and has so far limited its deployment almost exclusively to the simple authentication
domain. More recently the OpenID foundation has started to work on a new protocol
named OpenID Connect [18] that aims to unify authentication and authorization into
a single service protocol. This unification creates the right means for data access
authorization and it is a firm step towards solving the issues resulting from a too
limited set of widely recognized identity attributes.
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2.1.4.2 Microsoft .NET Passport
.NET Passport is a single sign-on identity management system developed for e-commerce
by Microsoft, where email addresses have been adopted as the user main identifier. In
.NET Passport, credential issuance and authentication are fully centralised operations
under the strict control of the Microsofts identity provider.
Microsoft extended the centralized model with the creation of ”InfoCards” [38] (later
named Windows CardSpace) in order to ensure a better level of security and trust be-
tween the involved parties however in 2011 the Windows CardSpace was discontinued.
Microsoft is currently working on a replacement called U-Prove [39].
U-Prove aims to provide a multiparty security (issuing organizations, users, and relying
parties can protect themselves not just against outsider attacks but also against attacks
originating from each other) and at the same time enables customized privacy settings
(including authenticated anonymity and pseudonymity).[40]
2.1.5 User Centric Models
User centric identity management is currently a hot research topic. Its main objective
is to empower users by returning control about who can access their personal data back
to them, the truly legitimate data owners [41, 12]. User centric identity management
models provide the users with the means to effectively decide who can access their
identity data. The whole process is based on having an identity manager receiving
requests for user attributes made by the data requesters, the relying parties, for which
the user is then provided with the means to choose the most appropriate subset of
identity attributes to disclose. This gives end users more privacy control and at the
same time more responsibility over their own choices.
For example Figure 2.3 illustrates a user centric scenario where users can store and
manage their identifiers and credentials, from different service providers, with a smart-
phone. The user decides which identifier and identity attributes will be deployed to
the a service provider and then inserts a pin to authorize the operation.
2.1.5.1 Higgins
Higgins was initially known as the Eclipse Trust Framework[42]. Its main objective
is to establish a software layer that can be built upon and expanded with other
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Figure 2.3: Smartphone user centric model
components and adapters. The Higgins Project splits identity information into small
blocks of data, known as i-cards, which can then be directly controlled by the user
and are meant to replace traditional password-based login systems.
I-cards can be created by mixing different digital identity data from different domains.
By mixing these different contexts, data aggregation is accomplished and interoper-
ability between distinct domains is thus established. The Bridging contexts is done
by a user agent operated by a browser extension and the Higgins card selector service.
Since the users’ data is directly processed at the user agent, the browser, identity
information does not need to be shared with a trusted third party and interoperability
can be reached by just having the user fully managing his own data.
2.2 Attribute Aggregation
Attribute aggregation is the process of acquiring identity attributes from multiple
distinct identity providers and Attribute Authorities (AA) in a single session. An AA
is an entity responsible for the security, management and disclosure of users data.
The users attribute aggregation deployment scenarios can be quite involved and com-
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plex and we where therefore required to first delve into a more comprehensive ex-
ploratory explanation of the different ways this has been described in the literature to
better understand the existing models and to start providing some answers to some
interesting but difficult research problems like: How much personal information the
relying parties/service providers (RP/SP) and Identity Providers should have access
to ? Who should be responsible for the final aggregation of the users’ data? What
authorizations and proofs are necessary to securely request a set of personal data?
How can a RP/SP be sure that who provided the data is really its legitimate Attribute
Authority ? How can the RP/SP know that a complete set of attributes relates only
to one single identity ?
After a comprehensive research about what are the most popular and comprehensive
user-centric attribute aggregation models, we came to the conclusion that the most
relevant models are:
2.2.1 Client mediated assertion
Based on an intelligent browser user agent that guide the user to the different identity
providers, obliging the users a high level of interaction by authenticate themselves
on each identity providers. The browser user agent is responsible for the attribute
aggregation and the attribute delivery to the requester relying party. In this model
no relying party or third trust party is involved in order to request and aggregate the
information its only based on browser technologies. [43]
2.2.2 Identity Federation model
Require a federated network in order to operate, during users’ authentication process,
a secret is generated and shared between all federated identity providers by a user
agent. The first contacted identity provider provides to the requester relying party the
details of the others identity providers that falls into the federation thus establishing
the necessary means to the relying party request the necessary attributes. [44]
2.2.3 Relying Party mediated attribute aggregation
Its based on the identity federated model however discards the necessity of a federated
network. The relying party redirects the user-agent to each identity provider thus
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obliging the users to a high level of interaction since the user has to authenticate
himself in every identity provider. The browser user agent is the responsible for
attribute aggregation thus requiring specifics browser based technologies. [45]
2.2.4 Identity proxying/chaining
The relying party has to fully trust in a single master federated identity provider that
is responsible to request and aggregate all requested attributes before send it back to
the requester relying party. In other words the master identity provider can request
attributes from all others identity providers that are within its federation circle.
This model have a low level of protection for user attributes since every intermediary
identity provider must relay on credentials intended for a third party. This means
create a possibility for a substitution attacks and as well as the possibility of an
identity provider sending false authentication information. [46]
2.2.5 Identity Relay
The relying party trust in a single master federated identity provider that is responsible
to request all attributes to the relying party, these attributes are returned directly
to relying party, in other words relying party is responsible to aggregate the set of
necessary attributes.
This model is like identity proxying but with a reduced level of trust on master identity
provider since the attribute aggregation is done by the relying party. The master
identity provider only redirect the attribute requests the others identity providers
that answer directly to the relying party. [43]
2.2.6 Linking Service
In this model only the user knows about all his identity providers. A service called
linking service is responsible to hold minimal information that allow relying parties
to obtain their queries from different identity providers domains. After a user au-
thenticates, the identity provider offers the possibility of attribute aggregation and if
the user authorizes it, the information to access the linking service is shared with the
relying party. The aggregation of attributes can be done by the linking service itself
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Table 2.3: Information Security Attributes
Key aspect Description
Confidentiality Information is shared only among authorised persons or organisa-
tions.
Integrity Information is authentic, complete and can only be accessed or
modified by those authorized to do so.
Availability Assurance that the systems responsible for delivering, storing and
processing information are accessible when needed.
or by the relying party.
The linking service model offers a good level of privacy for user attributes, since all
attribute assertions are signed by their sources, and users permission are requested in
order to deploy the attributes. The relying party must have a high trust on the liking
service node. [47]
2.3 Identity Management Common Standards
In order to establish the right means to guarantee key aspects of information security
(see table 2.3) in identity management systems, several standards started to appear,
some of them nowadays became essential tools in the deployment of identity manage-
ment systems.
In this section we described the most common standards used in identity management
systems and give a view of a new and still on development named OIX.
2.3.1 Kerberos
Kerberos is one of the earlier security standards developed. Kerberos is a secure
method for authenticating a request for a service in a computer network. Kerberos
was developed in the Athena Project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT). [48]
Kerberos allows a user to request an encrypted ”ticket” from an authentication process
that can then be used to request a particular service from a server. In Kerberos the
users’ password is computed by an one-way hash function that is used as a symmetric
key to read the ”ticket” provide by the kerberos server in order to establish the
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authentication. Notice that the users’ plaintext password do not pass through the
network.
2.3.2 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
Security Assertion Markup Language is a XML-based open standard data format for
exchanging authentication and authorization data between an identity provider and
relying parties, in other words, SAML defines an XML-based secure framework for ex-
changing identity information across security domains for purposes of authentication,
authorization and single sign-on. [49]
SAML specifies four components (see image 2.4): (1) The assertion component where
it is divided into three types: (a) the authentication assertion to validate the users’
identity, (b) the attribute assertion to hold specific attribute about the user, (c)
and the authorization assertion to identify what the user is allowed to do; (2) the
protocol component to defines how SAML requests for and receives assertions; (3)
the binding component to defines how SAML message exchanges are mapped into
standard messaging and communication protocols like HTTP, SMTP and also SOAP;
(4) and the profile component describes in detail how SAML assertions, protocols, and
bindings combine to support a defined use case, the most well known SAML profile is
the web browser single sign-on profile.
Figure 2.4: Components of the SAML Specifications
The SAML specification defines three roles: the principal (usually the user), the
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identity provider, and the service provider/relying party. In the use case addressed by
SAML, the user requests a service from the service provider that requests and obtains
an identity assertion from the identity provider. On the basis of this assertion, the
service provider can decide whether to perform some service for the connected user.
Before delivering the identity assertion to the service provider, the identity provider
may request some identification or authentication from the user such as user/password
login scheme in order to authenticate the user.
2.3.3 Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
XACML is an initiative to develop a standard for access control and authorization
systems by defining a declarative access control policy language implemented in XML
and a processing model describing how to evaluate authorization requests according to
the rules defined in policies. In other words XACML not only processes the authoriza-
tion requests, but it defines the mechanism for creating the complete infrastructure of
rules, policies, and policy sets to arrive at the authorization decisions. [50]
In XACML the access requests, are sent to a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), located
at a web server, which creates a XACML request and sends it to the Policy Decision
Point (PDP). The PDP determines the answer based on the existing policies in the
policy repository and sends back its determination to the PEP. The response can be
either access permitted or denied, with the appropriate obligations. Obligation is a
directive that if applicable must always be carried on the authorization process.
2.3.4 Web Services Federation (WS-Federation)
WS-Federation [51] describes how the assertions transformation model inherent in
security token exchanges can enable trust relationships and federation of services.
This allows scenarios where authorized access to resources managed in one realm can
be provided to security principals whose identities and attributes are managed in
different realms.
Web Services Federation has mechanisms for identity brokerage, attribute discovery
and retrieval, authentication and authorization assertions between federation mem-
bers, and protecting the privacy of these assertions across federation boundaries.
These mechanisms provide a basic trust model between identity providers and de-
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pendent parties through WS-Security, WS-Trust, and WS-Security Policy: (1) WS-
Security is a communications protocol and is the component that allows secure access
from web clients using HTTP or from web services clients directly. (2) WS-Trust is
the component that defines the Security Token Service (STS) and the protocol used
to request or issue a token. These tokens are generated from the assertions about an
entity requesting a service, (3) and WS-SecurityPolicy describes the STS policies and
its associated assertions.
2.3.5 Digital ID wallet
Digital ID wallet is an ITU-T international standard [52] that is a web-based digital
wallet. It is employed as storage for private data such as addresses, users’ ID,
and passwords. This standard follows the user-centric method diffusing the user
empowerment concept facing the federated identity management systems that move
the users’ control to the service providers and identity providers. The Digital ID wallet
standard emerges to shift back the control to its right owner, the user.
This standard uses tokens as secret keys that are automatically created for each visited
web site, which is stored in a client-based digital wallet. Thus, it is not necessary for
users to memorize individual passwords. The Digital ID wallet enables the user to
register and log onto a website, store personal information, and other data at any
time. This approach is independent of the existence of a Certification Authority and
is well suited to support mobile communication.
2.3.6 Open Identity Exchange (OIX)
The Open Identity Exchange [53] is a non-profit corporation serving as an independent,
neutral provider of certification trust frameworks for open identity technologies. This
means it follows an open market model to provide the certification services requested
to guarantee the necessary levels of identity assurance and protection. In other words
OIX is an open identity trust framework provider that provides certification in order
to enables a relying party to trust the identity, security, and privacy assurances from
an identity provider.
The OIX objective is to reduce the friction of using the Web by solving problems
like: how does a relying party know it can trust credentials from an identity service
provider without knowing if that providers’ security, privacy, and operational policies
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are enough to protect the relying party’s interests? OIX states that problem is a
business, legal, and social problem and not a technological problem.
Despite the fact that OIX is still on a modelling stage this project looks really
promissory since companies like Google, PayPal and at&t quickly become associated.
2.4 Security Concepts
In order to establish a secure connection to exchange information guaranteeing both
users are who they say they are and the messages are not being attacked/manipulated
secure methods/protocol were used. In this section some relevant technologies/protocols
are revised.
2.4.1 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography is an asymmetric scheme that uses a pair of keys for en-
cryption and signature process. The public key is employed to encrypt data or verify
digital signatures, and the corresponding private key is used to decryption or sign
data. (see figures 2.5 and 2.6) The public key must be disseminate over the global key
servers while the private key must be highly secured stored by the user. Anyone with
a copy of a public key can then encrypt information that only the respective private
key owner can read.
It is computationally unfeasible to deduce the private key from the public key so if
the private key is lost its public key is lost too. The public key cryptography solved
the need for the sender and the receiver to share secret keys via some secure channel,
allowing users to exchange messages securely without the need of a pre-existing security
arrangement. The most well known public key cryptography systems are:RSA, Diffie-
Hellman and DSA. [54]
2.4.1.1 Public Key Infrastructure
A Public Key Infrastructure contains the certificate storage facilities of a certificate
server, but also provides certificate management (the ability to issue, revoke, store,
retrieve, and trust certificates). The main feature of the Public Key Infrastructure is
the introduction of what is known as a Certification Authority (CA), a person, group,
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Figure 2.5: Public key cryptographic signature process
department, company, or other association that an organization has authorized to
issue certificates to its computer users. The certification authorities are analogous to
a country’s government’s Passport Office and can be seen as a trusted third party that
creates certificates and digitally signs them using its private key. Because of its role in
creating certificates, the CA is the central component of a Public Key Infrastructure.
Using the CA’s public key, anyone wanting to verify a certificate’s authenticity verifies
the issuing CA’s digital signature, and hence, the integrity of the contents of the
certificate. (see figure 2.7)
2.4.1.2 Digital Certificates
Digital certificates, or certs, simplify the task of establishing whether a public key
truly belongs to the purported owner.
A certificate is a special form of credential. Examples might be your national iden-
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tification card, your drivers license, or your birth certificate. Each of these has some
information on it identifying you and some authorization stating that someone else
has confirmed your identity. Some certificates, such as your passport, are important
enough confirmation of your identity that you would not want to lose them, lest
someone use them to impersonate you.
A digital certificate is data that functions much like a physical certificate. A digital
certificate is information included with a person’s public key that helps others verify
that a key is genuine or valid. Digital certificates are used to thwart attempts to
substitute one person’s key for another.
A digital certificate consists of three different components:
1. A public key.
2. Certificate information. (Identity information about the user)
3. One or more digital signatures. (Depending on the certification type)
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Figure 2.7: Certification validation by the usage of a Certification Authority
The purpose of the digital signature on a certificate is to state that the certificate
information has been attested to by some other person or entity. The digital signature
does not attest to the authenticity of the certificate as a whole; it vouches only that
the signed identity information goes along with, or is bound to, the public key. Thus,
a certificate is basically a public key with one or two forms of ID attached, plus a
stamp of approval from some other trusted individual.
Certificates are only useful while they are valid. It is unsafe to simply assume that a
certificate is valid forever. In most organizations and in all Public Key Infrastructures,
certificates have a restricted lifetime. This constrains the period in which a system
is vulnerable should a certificate compromise occur.There are also situations where
it is necessary to invalidate a certificate prior to its expiration date, such as when
an the certificate holder terminates employment with the company or suspects that
the certificate’s corresponding private key has been compromised. This is called
revocation. The most well known certificates are the PGP (pretty good privacy)
certificate usually used email systems and the X.509 certificate massively deployed on
the web in order to establish to HTTPS protocol.
The most well recognized PGP certificate characteristics are:
• Is issued by its creator (self-signed)
• Support multiple signatures in order to grant a greater trust on network
• Based on a web of trust
• It is free
and the most well recognized X.509 certificate characteristics are:
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• Is issued by a certificate authority (CA)
• Hierarchical approach
• Supports only one signature usually from the CA
• In order to be well recognized requires some costs.
2.4.2 Smartcard
A smartcard is a pocket-sized device with an embedded microprocessor that can pro-
vides secure: identification, authentication, data storage and application processing.
The chip of the microprocessor guarantees tamper-resistance [55] and its protocol in-
terface assures the security over its data access by being logically impossible to extract
information without the appropriate keys. The protocol interface set a strict control
over what can be directly accessed from the smartcard (even with the appropriate pin)
making almost impossible to clone it.
2.4.2.1 Mobile Secure Card
Due to its potential economical factor [8], the hunger for mobile devices that can act as
an authentication/authorization node are daily increasing. Mobile operators started
to explore the usage of smartphone as authorization brokers. Despite the fact that
mobile operator have the best profile to provide a service like that since they already
have a whole system prepared for this means, this operations will require an extra fee
for their customers. In order to not rely on single mobile operators and flee from the
extras fees an alternative path is the usage of smartcards on the smartphones.
Nowadays almost all smartphones accept the microSD card as its standard memory
extension to expand its storage capacity. In order to escape from the mobile operator
taxes we relied on the security properties of the mobile security card [56] for mobile
devices. This card provides an interesting technical standard known as SmartSD
which provides the necessary crypto components and device physical non-tampering
for our architecture. This process is archived by adding a smartcard component besides
the flash component inside the SD card. The mobile security card is a microSD
card that explores the SmartSD standard by embedding a smartcard chip that uses
JavaCard OS. This card is responsible for guarantee a strong users authentication and
trustworthy protection of data by the usage of cryptography components.
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2.4.3 Valet key based protocol
Nowadays many common authorization protocols are based on a valet key concept.
They all employ a token as a secure digital object that a pre-authorized entity needs
to present in order to have direct access to some restricted resource. In other words,
these tokens look like a key for data access in the sense that any entity who possesses
the key has temporary and restricted access to the protected resource.
The most common scenario is a token based authorization scheme involving three
distinct actors: The data owner (User), a third party application (Relying Party)
and the user data storage (Attribute Authority). In this scenario a user wants to
provide a relying party with an authorisation to access his data that resides on a
certain attribute authority. To achieve this, the relying party redirects the user to the
attribute authority with a formalised request where the user is asked to authorise it,
this request includes the data that the relying party desires to obtain and for how long
time he wants to access it. After authorisation, the attribute authority returns to the
relying party a signed authorisation token that allow the relying party to access the
requested data by presenting the signed authorisation token while it remains valid.
These tokens can be revoked at any time by the user that owns or manages the data.
These tokens must be extremely difficult to falsify and provide a flexible security
mechanism for the attribute authorities to more easily manage access control to
restricted resources. At the same time these tokens provide the Relying Parties with
the means to access otherwise restricted resources without the need to obtain, share
and manage other types of credentials like login/passwords.
2.4.3.1 Open Authorization (OAuth)
OAuth is an authentication and authorization protocol originally developed for web
applications that provides a standard method for clients to access server resources
on behalf of a resource owner by the usage of tokens. It also provides a process for
end-users to authorise third-party access to their server resources without sharing
their credentials, using user-agent redirection [3]. The most common analogy to this
protocol is the valet key.
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2.4.3.2 Azure Microsoft
Windows Azure is a Microsoft’s application platform that implements a public cloud.
Windows Azure can be used to build a web application that runs and stores its data in
Microsoft datacenters. It can connect on-premises applications with each other or to
map between different sets of identity information. In order to allow federation with
different identity providers such as a corporate Active Directory, Windows Live ID,
Facebook, Google, and OpenID 2.0 identity providers. Microsoft created an access
control service named as Windows Azure AD Access Control that work as a cloud
service that provides the necessary Security Token Service (STS) in order to establish
the network federation between the different identity providers.
2.5 Communication Concepts
In order to establish a connection between two or more different nodes a communica-
tion channel must be established. This section presents different protocols used for the
communication channel creation. This section describes a messaging protocol named
as XMPP, the well known HTTP by the usage of web services and an innovative
analogue communication channel archived by the usage of QR-Codes.
2.5.1 XMPP
XMPP is an open technology for real-time communication that uses the eXtensible
Markup Language (XML) as a base format for exchanging information encapsulated
into pieces of XML documents. These XML documents are sent from one entity to
another [57] by using an appropriate application level transport protocol according to
the network availability. XMPP servers provide a numerous set of standard of services
that can be adopted by the most different types of applications.
The XMPP is the almost ideal communication infrastructure for the establishment of
a security channel because of its services, namely:
• Almost real time messaging, essential for critical services.
• Authentication by the usage of certificates, guaranteeing a high level of trust
and non-repudium.
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• its ability to efficiently operate over HTTP by the means of the BOSH (Bidirectional-
streams Over Synchronous HTTP) protocol [58], where two non directly address-
able devices located on private closed intranets with minimal Internet access, can
locate each other over the Internet and then freely exchange messages between
themselves in a reliable and safe way.
• Its capacity to store and forward messages in case any of the nodes becomes
oﬄine, which is proving to be essential for asynchronous communications.
• Its scalability to avoid bottleneck problems and the fact that it is a mature
fully supported and approved Internet standard, widely deployed and an impor-
tant part of the communication operations and infrastructure of large distinct
companies like: Google, Facebook, Blizzard and Steam.
• The possibility of multi sessions in a single XMPP account organized by the
creation of XMPP resources.
• Peer-to-peer media sessions: allows a peer to negotiate and manage a composed
of large and complex audio/video data streams with another peer.
2.5.2 Web service
The term web service have many imprecise and ambiguous definitions. This issue
is derivable from the different existing concepts of the web services. In general a
web service can be defined as a distributed software system designed to support
interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a network that usually interacts
with the Word Wide Web (WWW) typically delivered over Hyper Text Transport
Protocol (HTTP). The communication payloads of web services are usually XML
documents, however, when performance demands web services can also use binary
payloads. The web services can be identified in two major classes:
2.5.2.1 REpresentation State Transfer (REST)
REST is a style (REST-style, also known as RESTful web service) of software architec-
ture for networks connected through hyperlinks. The most well known applied domain
for REST-style is the WWW that is a distributed network of hypermedia. In order
words, the RESTful web service is a subset of the URI (Uniform Resource Identifier)
in which provides an uniform interface semantics to manipulate web resources. [59]
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The main aspects of REST are:
• Resource Identification through the usage of URI
• Uniform Interface for all resources (HTTP as the Application-level Protocol,
observe table 2.4 ):
• Hyperlinks to define relationships between resources and valid state transitions
of the service interaction.
Table 2.4: HTTP verbs and their meaning in RESTful web servers
HTTP verb Meaning in RESTful
GET Query a resource in web server.
POST Create a resource in a web server.
PUT Update an existing resource in a web server.
DELETE delete a resource in a web server.
2.5.2.2 Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
SOAP is a lightweight XML-based messaging protocol that is independent of any plat-
form, transport protocol or operating system. It defines a set of rules for structuring
XML messages that can be used for simple one-way messaging. This set of rules are
known as SOAP message. It is not tied to any particular transport protocol though
HTTP is the most popular. Nor is it tied to any particular operating system or
programming language so the clients and servers in these dialogues can be running on
any platform and written in any language as long as they can formulate and understand
the SOAP messages. In SOAP-based web services the information remain ”outside of
the web” since there is no specific URI for the web server resources. [59]
There are two types of SOAP requests:
• SOAP-RPC that is an implementation of a Remote Procedure Call (RPC).
The clients invoke the web service by sending parameters and receiving return
values. RPC-style web services follow call/response semantics; therefore, they
are usually synchronous, which means that the client sends the request and waits
for the response until the request is processed completely.
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• Document style message, the client and/or server passes an XML document
as the body of the SOAP message instead of parameters (like SOAP-RPC).
Since the document message is usually a self-contained XML, it is better suited
for asynchronous processing considering that commonly there is no wait for a
response.
2.5.3 Quick Response code
The Quick Response code (QR code) is a two-dimensional square shape that encodes
a reasonable amount of digital information into a small amount of 2D space. The
encoding is achieved with the careful positioning of varying size black and white smaller
squares within the 2D space defined by the QR square.
These 2D codes are normally displayed within web pages or printed in paper posters
and are employed to quickly exchange digital information with mobile devices that
would otherwise had to be entered by hand. This is accomplished by having the
mobile device to digitally scan and decode the displayed QR code with its built-in
optical camera [60].
The usage of QR codes to share secret information can, in a way, be seen as the
establishment of a rather new secure communication channel that takes advantage
of the analog security properties of the optical channel that is employed during the
scanning of the QR codes by the smartphone. In practice QR codes are used to
simplify and make practical the enrollment process between different applications.
Chapter 3
Architecture Components
In this section we describe in detail the main technological components we have
employed in OFELIA. We also discuss the main aspects behind some of the alternatives
and compromises we had to make to integrate our vision with already existing real
world services and devices (ex: Google XMPP infrastructure, Android devices, etc...).
We also take some time to describe the conceptual data model for attribute aggregation
and its most relevant aspects like the protocols and services we have employed to
integrate the different components that compose the proposed architecture. Figure 3.1
shows the main relationships between the principal components and the type of
communications and the data exchanges that can occur between them in a simplified
way.
3.1 Architecture Technologies Overview
In what follows we provide a more detailed description of the functional role played
by each of the main technology in our proposed architecture.
3.1.1 microSD mobile card
The mobile security card is a microSD card that explores the SmartSD standard by
embedding a smartcard chip with JavaCard OS. This card have a special place in
our architecture since its responsible for guarantee a strong users authentication and
trustworthy protection of data. Otherwise we would to rely on a regular file based
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Figure 3.1: The purposed architecture communication
keystore, turning the smartphone in a desirable target of attacks where the keystore
file would be easily compromised. So it is reasonable to put the file based keystore level
of security in tandem with the security provided by a much simpler login/password
based scheme. In fact an attack on a password protected keystore involves a password
guessing attack completely analogous in terms of complexity to what happens with
an attack directed towards a login/password scheme, the only thing really different in
this case being the need to posses a copy of the keystore file in order to proceed with
the attack.
3.1.2 The XMPP messaging protocol
Arguably, in the mobile world, there is some difficulty in directly addressing and
communicating with Internet enabled mobile devices. In the mobile world an implicit
direct communication with the device is almost impossible due to the shortage of public
IPs addresses faced by Internet service providers and mobile operators. In the future,
IPv6 is supposed to solve this problem, however it is our strong belief that the mobile
Telecommunications operators will still not allow this kind of direct communication
to mobile phones due to their very inflexible business plans, where the mobile phone
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is nowadays mostly regarded simply as a consumer device and never as a provider
of services. In fact Telecommunications operators restrict even the ports available
to initiate communications and the most restrictive only allow direct communication
with the Internet over port 80 (standard HTTP port).
A neutral rendezvous point on the Internet where our architecture nodes can meet to
exchange messages is thus obviously necessary. Towards this end, XMPP messaging is
proving to be an almost ideal communication infrastructure for OFELIA to circumvent
these communication restrictions because of its ability to efficiently operate over
HTTP by the means of the BOSH(Bidirectional-streams Over Synchronous HTTP)[58]
protocol where two non directly addressable devices, located on private closed intranets
and with minimal Internet access, can locate each other over the Internet and then
freely exchange messages between themselves in a reliable and safe way.
3.1.3 Secure access authorization tokens
For security reasons the secure access authorisation token must be very hard to falsify.
In our project it takes the form of a base64 encoded XML excerpt, containing a
hash value created from elements for a large pseudo random number [61] and a
simple semantic statement element, describing the authorization validity restrictions
that apply to this particular authorization. This statement can express for example
temporal restrictions. In order to ensure a right level of authentication and non-
repudiation, this XML excerpt is always digitally signed by the users’ smartphone
private key. The resulting XML document is then encoded into a base64 string, which
then constitutes a well formed secure access authorization token.These tokens provide
a very flexible security mechanism for the attribute authority to more easily manage
access control to restricted resources. At the same time these tokens provide the
relying parties with the means to access otherwise restricted resources without the
need to obtain, share and manage other types of credentials.
In our proposed architecture these authorisation tokens are issued by the authority
broker (users smartphone) and are shared with the Identity Broker and the Attribute
Authority, in order to provide for data access. It is also important to clarify that in
our model the user maintains the revocation rights by being able to unconditionally
revoke these tokens, at any given moment, by the means of his personal smartphone
that acts as an Authority Broker.
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3.1.4 The OFELIA TRUST infrastructure
One of the key critical components of our proposed architecture is the management of
trust among the participating components. To establish the necessary level of trust
we rely on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that is responsible for the management
of the certificates that are at the core of the privacy, trust, non-repudiation and
authentication infrastructure mechanisms that we need to put in place to secure our
architecture.
To establish a stronger and therefore more trustworthy identity/authentication be-
tween the different actors, namely: the relying party (data requester), the attribute
authority (data storage) ,the identity broker (identity manager) and the authorization
broker (users smartphone), we rely on the deployment of a well managed standard
compliant PKI that can also sign PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) and X509 certificates.
These certificates are then used as securely vouched identity credentials that is em-
ployed to establish highly secure communication channels, with a reasonable degree
of non-repudiation properties and trust between the different actors involved in the
communication.
3.1.5 XML Schema
In order to create the right semantics for interoperability, between different nodes
with different implementations, it is essential to have an efficient and highly expressive
semantic model for digital identity. This process is highly complex and still requires
more comprehensive research from the community as a whole to reach a state where
it becomes more practical to automatically reason with identity attributes. [62]
Despite the importance in establishing efficient semantic models for digital identity,
this chapter focus is on identity attribute aggregation, so the more complex process
involved with digital identity semantics will be addressed as future work. Meanwhile
we have designed a more simplified digital identity data representation, based on a
XML Schema, that we employ throughout our implementation to keep and promote
interoperability for data exchange within OFELIA. The figure 3.2 shows the designed
XML Schema skeletal structure that consists in a root element named OfeliaDataEx-
change and it is composed by three main elements: Header, User and Data.
The Header element has two attributes: the State used to describe the current oper-
ation and the Type to define the actual stage of the operation. The State operations
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Figure 3.2: Architecture data exchange XML Schema
are classified as: (1) DATALIST used to exchange the list of existing attributes
between the smartphone and the identity broker; (2) TOKENS to handle the process
of authorization token request; and (3) DATA used to process the data request when
data access was previously conceived. The Type is defined in 3 stages: REQ, ASW
and ERR that represent respectively request, answer and error.
The User element is composed by three attributes and one element. The attributes are:
the JabberID to hold the requester XMPP contact; the OpenID to hold the requester
OpenID address and the PubKey to hold requester public key. The element is named
Tokens and is composed by three attributes: the AuthToken that is responsible to
hold the authorization token; the Secret that acts as a nonce [63]; and the ExpireDate
as its own name suggests holds the token expire date.
The Data element is composed by optional elements. Currently we have a gps element
defined with the following attributes: Latitude, Longitude and timestamp. We are
currently defining several other elements to describe other dynamic attributes like
heart beat, blood pressure, etc that could prove to be useful for remote monitoring web
applications. The Data element can thus contain highly diverse types of formalised
dynamic data types, to cover a Highly diverse range of application areas. In other
words, we can provide for all kind of personal dynamic attributes so long as its data
type is formalised in the OfeliaDataExchange XML Schema. It is also mandatory that
all Data elements have a valid timestamp attribute, not only to be able to maintain
an historic value for its values but also to prevent the resending of the same value
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during different data exchanges.
3.1.6 QR Code
In our architecture, QR codes are displayed at computers displays to expedite in
a secure way the enrollment process of smartphones into the Identity Broker and
the Attribute Authorities. QR codes are a very convenient way of conveying a
reasonably amount of secret shared information to a smartphone that would otherwise
be extremely cumbersome to input by hand by the user.
3.2 Architecture nodes overview
In this section we described the architecture nodes and their importance in our
proposed architecture.
3.2.1 OpenID Connect Identity Services
In OFELIA we employ OpenID as an authenticator and as the provider of the boot-
strapping information required by the Relying Party to enroll into the Identity Broker.
The users essential information that is needed for bootstrapping consists in two key
identity attributes, the Identity Broker Internet domain address and the user’s public
key.
3.2.2 Relying Party/Service Provider (RP/SP)
The Relying party or Service Provider are a web applications that requires users’
identity attributes that are being held by the user AAs aggregation. We plan to
develop and implement RP/SP software library components to allow for a much more
simple integration of current existing web application into our proposed infrastructure.
The software library components must provide functionalities for X509/PGP cer-
tificate management, support OpenID Connect authentication and be capable of
asynchronously, discover, request, access and store users identity attributes and se-
curely manage authorization tokens. These are issued by the users smartphone, at
the users discretion, whenever a RP/SP asks authorization to access a set of users
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identity attributes. They contain, among other elements, validity semantic assertions
determined by the user that must hold true when the requesting RP/SP presents it to
an AA as proof of access entitlement. These tokens are digitally signed by the user at
the smartphone to guarantee their integrity and authenticity. An RP/SP must also
be capable of secure crypto session keys negotiation with the users AAs by using the
IdB as a relay. It must also provide encryption/decryption functionalities for sensitive
identity attributes and be capable of parsing and analysing AAs identity assertions
according to a digital identity XML semantic specifications. The RP/SP should also
provide safe caching of authorization tokens while their validity assertions holds true.
3.2.3 Attribute Authorities
The Attribute Authorities (AAs) are independent network entities responsible for the
security and management of personal data. The user smartphone needs to be enrolled
into each one of the AAs in order to establish the data aggregation. In order to
determine which personal attributes are being held at the AA, the user smartphone is
provided with a XML semantic description of the identity attributes that are being held
at each enrolled AA. The smartphone then merges the description of the AA identity
resources into the users personal data aggregation and announces to the identity broker
that it is the custodian aggregator for that data and is now ready to act as a personal
authorization broker and issue authorization tokens at the users discretion.
The participating AAs must also be provided with appropriate security mechanisms
for authentication and authorization to ensure the appropriate level of access control
necessary to protect these assets from unauthorized access and provide the RP/SP with
the means to search for identity attributes and negotiate with the identity brokers and
user smartphone the authorization tokens needed to be able to access the resources
being held by the users aggregation.
This type of framework allows for a simple and scalable integration of an already
existing infrastructure of personal data repositories as AAs. For authentication reasons
each participating AA must be provided with a public key pair whose authenticity must
be attested by a valid PKI X509 or PGP certificate containing the AAs identity. Each
AA must also store a list of the emitted authorization tokens whose validity assertions
still hold true but have been for some reason revoked by the user.
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3.2.4 The Identity Broker
The identity broker acts like a privacy enhancing blind caching-proxy for identity
attributes that hides from the RP/SP the real network location of the attribute
authority responsible for that data. We need to keep in mind the importance of
catering for the situations where the RP/SP cannot be fully trusted and it is therefore
important to hide the attribute authority real network location behind a trusted
identity broker. Moreover for privacy and security reasons the identity broker must
also not know the content of the personal data it is relaying. This is accomplished by
having the RP/SP and attribute authority to negotiate session keys and then encrypt
all personal data that is being relayed by the identity broker.
The proposed architecture aims for a trust balance where the RP/SP does not have to
know about the aggregation of attribute authorities and the identity broker does not
need to know about the nature and value of the personal attributes being requested by
the RP/SP. For authentication purposes and to prevent men in the middle attacks it
is mandatory for the identity broker to be in the possession of a public key pair whose
legitimacy can be attested by a valid PKI X509/PGP certificate with the identity
brokers’ identity.
3.2.5 The smartphone as a Secure Digital Wallet
In OFELIA we are employing android smartphones as highly decentralized personal
access authorization management devices for identity management, empowering the
user by allowing the creation of customized access control policies that the user finds
most adequate for his own personal data. This means that the user is no longer obliged
to comply with the abusive identity management policies, normally in place at major
sites where the user have to share or give full control of his data to network entities he
does not fully know or does not fully trust, as happens with the majority of current
Internet applications. OFELIA also brings some advantages in security due to the full
hidden decentralization it imposes on the storage of identity attributes.
This application is the critical component of the user digital identity access and
should thus be always reachable over the Internet. Unfortunately this is not always
possible. Network aware smartphone application are highly demanding in terms of
phone battery and network signal usage and therefore cannot be always left running.
In order to circumvent this problem the identity broker can be configured by the user
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to send a SMS message requesting the smartphone to reconnect. This is archived by
the SMS handler service installed on the smartphone in the same time the application
is installed. When the SMS handler receives a reconnect SMS message, it launches
our application thus reconnecting the smartphone. After a certain period of inactivity
our application terminate itself to save on phone battery.
All mechanisms related to authorization token creation, token revocation, attribute
access authorization and the enrollment into attribute authorities and the identity bro-
ker are conducted by the user interacting with smartphone application. More details
about tokens authorization and attribute authorities and identity broker enrollment
process are discussed in chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Entities enrollment and case
scenario
In our architecture the smartphone plays a key role by acting as the user personal
authorization broker. The user starts by enrolling his smartphone into each one of
the aggregation participating Attribute Authorities that manage the users personal
data. This process allows the mobile device to create an aggregated list of all possible
identity data attributes available for that particular user. This list remains solely
within the local province of each user personal mobile device and is not disclosed to
the network. This helps prevents the massive aggregation of personal data by the
Internet operators and gives back to the user some degree of control over his identity
attributes.
The smartphone must also be enrolled into an Identity Broker so that the user can
then announce and manage the list of attributes names and respective types that can
then be made available to the requesting Relying Parties (RP). The authorization
tokens needed to access the attributes that are being maintained within the AAs are
issued by the users smartphone at the users discretion, after an access request is made
by some RP. The creation of the available attributes list is dynamic and must thus be
updated each time the smartphone is enrolled or unrolled from an AA, thus increasing
or decreasing the number of attributes announced by the identity broker for relying
parties, all this under the strict control of the user. In this section we provide a
detailed explanation of the different kind of enrollments in a step by step fashion, in
order to allow for a better and more comprehensive understanding of the main features
provided by the proposed architecture.
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4.1 Attribute Authority enrollment
In order to start managing access to his identity attributes, the user first needs to
enroll his smartphone with each one of the participating AAs. This process can be
done at any time, and should be as effortless and automatic as possible, giving more
freedom to the user to painless add or remove AAs as he so wishes. All participating
AAs must therefore be OFELIA ready, in other words they must use the AA OFELIA
framework and API (mentioned in section 4.1) to properly engage with the other
infrastructure participants.
Our architecture provides AAs with an easy and secure method to help the user link
his smartphone to the AAs accounts that make up the users attribute aggregation.
This is achieved with the help of a specially built AA enrolling web page, where
the set of parameters that must be provided to the smartphone to instantiate the
linkage with the AA is codified into a specially built QR-code that is displayed on the
computer screen as part of the users AA web session. This QR-code is then conveyed
to the smartphone by the means of its digital camera. It provides all the necessary
URL locations, the AA X509 certificate and the access token the smartphone needs
to instantiate the linkage with the AA in a secure way. To enroll is phone with a
particular AA the user only has to start an authenticated web session with this AA
and then use his smartphone to scan the web session QR-code that is displayed for
the enrollment process with the OFELIA application that has already been previously
installed in the users personal device. Notice that the smartphone acts as the root
node of the AAs, aggregating the user’s AAs including their different credentials when
applicable.
Figure 4.1 exemplifies the AA enrolment process providing a more technically detailed
description of the whole process. This enrollment process is completed in 6 steps:
1. User requests authorization by sending the necessary credential using a web
browser.
2. The Attribute Authority grants access if the user credentials are valid.
3. The user request a full access token in order to establish a data access link for
the smartphone.
4. The Attribute Authority answers with a data access token and the AA access
web services addresses encrypted with the users’ public key, all compiled and
encoded as a QR code.
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Figure 4.1: AA enrollment flow
5. The user uses the OFELIA application in his smartphone to scan the QR-
code from the computer screen. The OFELIA mobile application will then
automatically proceed and finalize the enrolment process without the need of
any further help from the user.
4.2 Identity broker enrollment
In order to establish a communication channel between the relying parties and the
user attributes stored in the AAs, the user must also have his smartphone enrolled
with an OFELIA identity broker.
This enrollment process between the users smartphone and the identity broker is very
similar to the enrollment process described for the AAs. But first the user must use an
internet browser to login/authenticate into the IdB with an OpenID Connect account,
that is responsible to provides the IdB with an XMPP identity (jabber address) and
the public key of the users smartphone. The user is then presented with a QR-
code at the computer screen, that can then be scanned by its smartphone, using the
OFELIA App. This QR-code contains all the information the smartphone needs to
automatically enroll into the IdB. The IdB also provides the user with a web interface
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where he can list the history of all the RP/SP attribute requests interactions that
have been performed by other third parties. This enrollment process is demonstrated
on figure 4.2.
After completing the IdB enrollment process, the user is then free to interact with
the mobile OFELIA application to decide upon and determine the restrictions that
should be associated with each access requests being made by third party RP/SP web
applications. The user can always use the OFELIA App to revoke previously issued
and still valid authorizations tokens.
1
OpenID ConnectIdentity Broker (IdB)
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Figure 4.2: Identity Broker enrollment flow
1. The user authenticates at IdB via Openid Connect account and allows the IdB
to request the user XMPP address and its public key.
2. The Openid Connect answers to the IdB with the requested data.
3. The IdB sends back to the user computer screen an image of a QR-code of
a temporary random link to the IdB session enrollment required data: X509
Certificate, users identification and IdB addresses (XMPP and web addresses)
For security reasons this link can only be used once and his discarded by the
IdB immediately after use.
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4. The OFELIA App scans the QR-code, obtains the link and uses it to retrieve
the enrollment data directly from the Internet.
5. The IdB sends to the smartphone an XMPP signed challenge, encrypted with the
smartphone public key that has been previously obtained by OpenID Connect.
6. The OFELIA App on the smartphone answers the IdB challenge by sending an
XMPP reply containing the list of the attribute names and respective types, that
the user desires to share. Note that list is defined by the user in the OFELIA
App, if the user do not select the attributes the OFELIA App replies with all
the attribute names and respective types that are being aggregated by the users
smartphone.
7. The IdB confirms the registration to the users smartphone and this concludes
the mobile phone IdB enrollment process.
4.3 Service provider enrollment
Every time the user decides to register a new RP, another enrollment process is
triggered in order to allow for the OFELIA requests and data exchange to take place.
This process is a bit longer than the other enrollments since we have the participation
all OFELIA components.
The user employs an internet browser to logins/authenticates into the RP with its
OpenID Connect account, which provides the IdB address as part of one of the users’
identity attributes and allows the RP to enroll with IdB as a users’ authorized RP
application that can ask for the values of a subset of identity attributes approved
for that particular RP. After enrollment the RP can then request to the IdB a
list of personal attributes. This is done via a XMPP message from the RP to the
IdB requesting the list of the available users’ data for that RP. This triggers an
authorization request from the IdB to the users’ smartphone that must be acted upon
by the user and leads to the issuing of authorization tokens by the smart phone.
On the users’ approval, the OFELIA mobile application creates signed access tokens
for each one of the involved data storages (AAs) and also sends an encrypted copy of
these access tokens to the RP via the IdB. In this case the encryption is done with
the RP public key. This prevents a malicious IdB from issuing data requests on its
own. Now the RP can request attributes from IdB while the authorization given by
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the user remains valid. This scenario is exemplified in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: RP/SP enrollment flow
1. The user authenticates to the RP via its Openid Connect account allowing the
RP to request his public key and the IdB URL HTTP location.
2. Openid Connect answers to the RP with the requested data.
3. The RP makes a TLS REST registration request to the IdB, providing its
certificate as the client cert for the TLS connection that is established from
the RP to the IdB. The registration request contains the OpenID request link,
some descriptive information details (to be displayed at the users mobile phone)
about the RP service and a list of the requested attributes encrypted by the
user’s public key.
4. The IdB tests the OpenID request link in order to verify if the request is valid.
5. Openid Connect answers the IdB, If the answer from the OpenID server comes
as a replay-attack [63] attempt, it in fact confirms to the IdB that the user has
been previously authenticate with OpenID at the requesting RP and therefore
this RP enrollment attempt is legitimate. This is a widespread OpenID hack
that allows a service to verify if the user has already been previously OpenId
authenticated at some other site. The IdB can then pre-register the RP by
generating an RP identifier token.
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6. The IdB sends a XMPP message to the smartphone containing a signed request
message with the encrypted RP data request plus other requesting RP details
(identifier token, certificate, details of service and RP URL HTTP location).
7. At the users’ discretion, an access authorization token is generated by the
smartphone and sent back to the IdB encrypted with the RP public key and
encrypted with each AA public key to each one of the involved AA with the RP
details.
8. The IdB validates the RP registration by sending to the RP the encrypted access
token that has been issued by the smartphone.
4.4 Usage case Scenario
In this section we presented two distinct case scenarios of our architecture. The first
focused on the attribute aggregation paradigm and its benefits on e-commerce [64].
The second case scenario focused on the attribute authorization access problem and
its advantages on e-health sector.
4.4.1 Attribute Aggregation scenario in e-commerce
For a credible illustrative OFELIA aggregation scenario, imagine an online bookstore
as a Relying Party and for example a credit card company and university acting as
Attribute Authorities. Now lets assume the user is online shopping at the online
bookstore and upon completion of his purchase, if he can prove that he has a specific
bank card and is a student of certain university, the online bookstore gives him an
immediate special discount on books of his study domain.
At the moment of purchase and after the user had already been authenticated via
OpenID Connect, the online bookstore, acting as a RP, will request the IdB of
that user for proof of bank card and university membership for that particular user.
This triggers an authorization request made by the IdB that is displayed at the user
smartphone, to authorize the necessary AAs to disclose this information. The user
can then use the OFELIA App application installed at his smartphone to authorize
both AAs (university and bank card) to disclose the users membership status (signed
by the AAs X509 certificates) to the bookstore. These authorizations take the form
of digitally signed authorization tokens that are registered on the respective AAs and
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delivered to the IdB encrypted with the RP public keys. The IdB then acts as a
relay and sends the signed encrypted authorization tokens back to the Relying online
bookstore (RP).
The RP, now in possession of these digitally signed authorization tokens, can then sent
them to the IdB, encrypted with the respective AA public key each time the online
bookstore wants to get evidence the user is still a valid customer of the bank and
member of an university. These access tokens together with the identity consultation
requests are then digitally signed and relayed by the IdB into the appropriate AAs,
which upon analyzing the validity of the accompanying authorization tokens can
deliver the requested information back to the IdB, digitally signed by the AAs and
encrypted for the RP. This encryption step is important in order to establish a high
level of privacy and security. The IdB should not know the value of the identity
attributes, otherwise the entity responsible for the IdB would be in a position of
doing massive data aggregation with their users data, and that aggregation by itself
would become a much more prized target for attacks. This constitutes two of the
main reasons for OFELIA to have been developed in the first place, i.e, to provide an
identity/authorization versatile infrastructure that does not depend upon the massive
aggregation of users’ identity attributes.
Finally the IdB relays the requested encrypted information to the RP that can verify
its integrity and validity by decrypting the attributes values and verifying the validity
of its digital signatures and thus letting the online bookstore (RP) apply the special
discount on books of the buyer subject studies domains.
4.4.2 Attribute authorization access scenario in healthcare
To better understand our architecture capabilities on e-health sector we defined a
storyboard of a patients’ parent, more precisely, a daughter that wants to access her
mothers’ (the patient) medical information by the means of her computer.
Katherine, a 50 years old woman that resides in Mystic Falls, has recently finished
her radiotherapy treatments after being diagnosed with breast cancer. Her daughter,
Agnes, who lives in a different city 600km away, desires to monitor her mothers follow-
up consultations. Assuming that both mother and daughter are already enrolled at the
same healthcare institution, Agnes, the daughter, requires Katherine, the EHR owner,
an authorization to access Katherines’ EHR with her smartphone. Katherine, also us-
ing her smartphone decides to grant access to her daughter. However, Katherine wants
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to customize some of the access control rules since she desires to omit the treatments
record component, creating the specific role Patients Daughter for that purpose. Now
Agnes accesses her healthcare institution website (that triggers the adapted version
of our identity broker) with her browser and a QR code is returned and read by the
smartphone application that handles the authorization process with the XMPP server
into the adapted identity broker. After that, Agnes browser automatically refreshes
with a list of the patients for which she has permissions to access. Now Agnes selects
her mother assuming her assigned role, Patients Daughter, allowing Agnes to read the
wished follow-up consultations record component.
Example of Katherine's EHR - Breast Pathology Folder
User: Agnes
Functional role: subject of care 
agent direct
Role: Patient's Daughter
Complementary Diagnostics Tests (CDT)
Record component: imaging tests information 
 Sensitivity: privileged 
Treatments (T)
Record component: radiotherapy information
Sensitivity: privileged
Family History (FH)
Record component: genetic information
Sensitivity: privileged
Consultations (Cons)
Record component: diagnostic, group and follow-up consultations 
information
Sensitivity: privileged
R
R
Demographic Data (DD)
Record component: general data information
Sensitivity: normal
R
R
Read permissions in record components
R
Locked record component 
Figure 4.4: Agnes access permissions to Katherines’ breast pathology folder
Figure 4.4 illustrates the use case of the above described storyboard. This use-case
shows an example of the EHR folder regarding the Breast Pathology components [65].
The user Agnes accesses Katherines EHR, with the Patients Daughter role, attributed
by her mother, which gives Agnes permissions to only read the following components:
demographic data, family history, consultations and complementary diagnostics tests.
Due to the role restrictions made by her mother, Agnes cannot access the treatments
component.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
We are currently sitting at a crossroads where the mega Internet corporations of today
are amassing an inordinate amount of personal information and thus concentrating too
much power into their own hands. These Internet giants are comfortably embarking
on a journey that is certainly brilliant for their shareholders but very bleak and
unbalanced for the common user, who is most of the time unaware that he is the
product being sold at the services he so diligently uses on the Internet. The service
providers feel very comfortable with this unbalanced situation and they will not make
any effort to change this status quo. But the future is yet to be written and if we, the
users, are given back some level control about our personal data, we will be able to
transport ourselves into more joyous shores and reach other destinations where users
are treated not simply as merchandise to be sold on the Internet but as real business
partners that only disclose their most sensitive identity attributes when needed and
when the “price” is right. However this market for personal data attributes can only
be fair, and provide the user with a fair share of the profits, if he is provided with the
technical means to disclose personal data for limited periods of time and keep those
authorizations under strict revocation control. We firmly believe OFELIA constitutes
a firm step in the right direction, and hope to have convinced the reader, with the
work we have presented with this document, that this is so.
5.1 Research summary
We have studied the main identity management and attribute aggregation models to
identify and take inspiration from the best of breed practices. We have then integrated
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these into an innovative user-centric mobile device based system. This system can
be used by users to self-manage access control to aggregate identity attributes in a
versatile, distributed, secure and privacy enhanced way. At the same time users are
provided with the means to customize on the fly revocable access control assertions
that can be fully adapted to the entity that is requesting access to personal data. The
OFELIA framework architecture is the result embodiment of these requirements.
With this dissertation we have described a fully working user centric identity man-
agement and attribute aggregation linking model, enhanced with mobile devices and
provided with innovative solutions for facilitating all the entities enrollment into the
identity management infrastructure. We have also described and taken inspiration
from several other proposed identity management systems, because they serve to illus-
trate and help explain very useful security mechanisms and communications protocols
(such as OpenID and OAuth) that have been directly or indirectly integrated into the
OFELIA architecture. These are: (1) XMPP, RESTful web services and QR-Codes for
communications; (2) Public Key Infrastructure (including PGP and X509 certificates),
smartcards and authorization tokens to ensure security and privacy; (3) XML Schemas
to guarantee interoperability between the different architectural components.
We believe we have accomplished the main objectives that we have propose to achieve
at the beginning of the work that lead to this dissertation. However OFELIA is very
much a work in progress and what has been done until now can only be seen as a
first step for a more complete a proof of concept that must now be exercised by being
evaluated in the context of real usage case scenarios.
5.2 Main findings
We can infer from the current state of the art (Chapter 2) that identity management
and attribute aggregation models are nowadays very hot research topics with a high
interest not only due to the sheer number of authors that dedicate their research
budgets over it, but also by the the real impact they can have on society and the way
hundreds of millions of users will interact with the services provided by the Internet in
the near future. However we have also found that none of the IdMs we have studied
so far fully satisfied on their own our initial research goals and questions about secure
user-centric and distributed identity attribute aggregation. Nevertheless they provided
us with security mechanisms and guidelines that where fundamental to integrate our
ideas into a new user-centric mobile based architecture embodying the research goals
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we had set for ourselves at the beginning of our work.
Our identity attribute aggregation architecture allows for a greater participation,
responsibility and control over who can access personal information by the user. In
OFELIA the user is responsible for the distribution of his identity attributes over
the Internet and have them managed and controlled by fully integrated Attribute
Authorities. These attribute authorities should be the direct source and final authority
about the identity attribute. This allow us to also refine the concept of highly dynamic
identity attributes, by having AAs directly attached to the data-source. The user can
also only aggregate the necessary identity attributes when needed and this allow us
to embody the highly popular concept of the identity persona.
Access to the users’ identity attributes is restricted only to pre-authorized requesters
(service providers or users). These authorizations are emitted by the users’ smart-
phone at the user discretion and take the form of authorization tokens with temporal
constrains and access rules. We have argued and hope to have convinced the reader
about the merits of using the smartphone as the ”de facto” mobile asynchronous
authorization broker.
XMPP has also proved to be an excellent choice for the establishment of secure and
asynchronous communication channels between the smartphone, the identity broker
and the attribute authorities. Its benefits were already described in section 2.5.1 and
have been experimented first hand during the implementation work we have conducted
for the OFELIA proof of concept.
5.3 Current OFELIA implementation limitations
In order to take advantage of OFELIA the user has to understand and possess basic
skills on the use information technologies(IT) and be basically proficient on the use of
smartphones. Other limitation is that the mobile application has currently only been
developed for the Android platform, which restricts the scope of its users.
The use of a non-standard identity XML specification language can be seen as problem
for the architecture interoperability and acceptability. The XML Schema we have
used have only been created for interoperability between the architecture nodes, since
identity modelling was not the focus of this thesis and the use of other XML languages
like SAML or XACML, could affect our choices over the architecture due to their
already made profiles and their specific library implementations. However we recognize
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the high importance of appropriate identity modelling and intend to address it as
future work.
Due to the highly divergence of data providers and services providers, the full in-
tegration with already running identity providers (Google, Facebook) is not as well
supported in OFELIA as we would like it to be. This will be addressed as future work
as well.
5.4 Future work
Portability is essential in order to maximize the interest in our architecture. For now
the smartphone application has been developed for the android platform. We want to
port it to other smartphone systems like IOS, BADA and Windows phone.
We also want to concentrate our future research efforts into the construction of
a stronger semantic models for identity management. This is highly complex but
necessary for services where automated management and reasoning with personal
attributes could be useful. At the moment OFELIA has a very simple semantics
for identity attributes that work as a starting proof of concept. A research about
identity semantic models and the adoptions of standards such as SAML are currently
being addressed as future plans.
Digital signature and encryption are also fundamental parts of our proposed architec-
ture, but at the moment they are yet to be integrated and are in development due to
the fact that we we are still running tests with mobile security cards [55] and figuring
the best way to integrate them into the Android mobile platform.
We are also currently implementing and deploying OFELIA in the health sector
[22] with a very specific user-empowering usage case scenario in a real healthcare
institution, more precisely on Sa˜o Joa˜o hospital centre, which is the second biggest
hospital in Portugal.
5.5 Conclusion
The proposed architecture is an user centric empowering infrastructure where it is
possible to securely dynamically manage the aggregation of identity attributes from
different authorization authorities into a single user centric digital identity whose
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authorizations can be managed in a novel versatile way involving for example temporal
constraints by the arbitrage of the user smartphone. An versatile infrastructure like
this can be easily applied in different application domains.
The architecture also possesses innovative mechanisms to protect users privacy by
preventing the massive aggregation of users identity attributes into a single place. We
have taken special care to prevent the disclosure of identity attributes values at the
identity broker precisely to prevent the massive disclosure of user data lest the identity
broker be compromised. Thus if an attacker compromises the identity broker he will
not have disclosed the users identity attributes values that should therefore continue
to remain safe in a privacy aware away. Furthermore since the identity attributes are
always held by their original source (the attribute authority) the identity attributes
maintains a kind of freshness state.
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Appendix A
Development notes
We have employed several open source libraries and applications to implement the
different OFELIA components and assemble a testbed to run demo OFELIA appli-
cations. We have developed a demo web application (relying party) where a user
authorizes another to track his GPS positioning for a certain period of time. The
Relying party application uses the OFELIA infrastructure to obtain authorization
tokens from the users mobile phone and then uses these tokens to obtain the users
GPS coordinates from the users mobile device (that is running an AA implementation
that knows about the phone GPS). The application then maps the GPS coordinates
for visualization by using the services provided by google maps for the requesting user
to see.
In this appendix we review the software libraries we have used to assemble the OFELIA
testbed and develop the fully functional demo we have just described.
We also presented some real application screen captures.
A.1 Identity Broker Web Service
The identity broker is a RESTful web service developed in Oracle Java SE 7 by
the usage of the Java development kit (JDK) and deployed on the Apache Tomcat
Servlet/JSP container version 7.
The libraries employed for the implementation were:
• Apache Xerces2 Java is a library for parsing, validating and manipulating
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XML documents.
– Website: http://xerces.apache.org/xerces2-j/
– Version: 2.11.0
– Download link: http://mirrors.fe.up.pt/pub/apache//xerces/j/binaries/Xerces-
J-bin.2.11.0.tar.gz
• Openid4java as its own name suggests is a library that provides the right means
to consume OpenID identities for Java applications.
– Website: http://code.google.com/p/openid4java/
– Version: 0.9.5.593
– Download link: http://openid4java.googlecode.com/files/openid4java-full-
0.9.5.593.tar.gz
• Smack API is a Java open source XMPP client library for instant messaging
and presence from Ignite Realtime.
– Website: http://www.igniterealtime.org/projects/smack/
– Version: 3.2.2
– Download link: http://www.igniterealtime.org/downloads/download-landing.jsp?
file=smack/smack 3 2 2.tar.gz
• MySQL Connector offers a standard database driver connectivity for using
MySQL with applications and tools that are compatible with industry standards
ODBC and JDBC. Since we are developing in Java we used the Connector/J.
– Website: http://www.mysql.com/downloads/connector/
– Version: 5.1.22
– Download link: http://www.mysql.com/get/Downloads/Connector-J/mysql-
connector-java-5.1.22.tar.gz/from/http://cdn.mysql.com/
• ZXing is an open-source, multi-format 1D/2D barcode image processing library
implemented in Java. In the identity broker is responsible to generate the QR-
Codes.
– Website: http://code.google.com/p/zxing/
– Version: 2.0
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– Download link: http://zxing.googlecode.com/files/ZXing-2.0.zip
Figure A.1 presents the identity broker package tree that is composed by three pack-
ages:
(1) The org.ofelia is composed by just one class, the core.java responsible to handle
and redirect all the identity broker requests (XMPP or HTTP), this class acts as the
identity broker backbone.
Figure A.1: IdB package tree
(2) The org.ofelia.handler is composed
by six classes that act as the web service
handlers: (i) The DBHandler.java han-
dles the necessary SQL functions to read
and write the identity broker database;
(ii) the ExtraHandler.java is responsible
to hold generic functions as simple math
or print methods; (iii) the SecurityMeth-
ods.java handles the functions to manage
the access tokens and the cryptographic
methods; (iv) the XmlHandler.java holds
the methods to read, write and validate
the XML documents; (v) the XmppHan-
dler.java stores the methods to establish
and manage a xmpp connections; (vi)
and the XMPPmessageListener.java in-
terface implements the observer pattern
in order to notify the core class every
time a xmpp message is received.
(3) The org.ofelia.servlets is composed
by four servlets that are normally in-
voked by an OFELIA JavaServer Page
(JSP). These four servlets are: (i) the
devreg.java responsible to register new AAs at the identity broker; (ii) the login.java
to handle the user registration and login process by the usage of an OpenID server;
(iii) the qrtest.java is used to generated the necessary QR codes to guarantee the
enrollment process; (iv) and the request.java responsible to handle the authorization
process by preparing and sending an xmpp message to the users’ smartphone.
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The ofelia.properties is the configuration file that holds the XMPP and SQL server
accounts and the ofeliaqr.png is the logo of the OFELIA project.
Figure A.2 represents the identity broker enhanced entity relationship (EER) database
model. This database allows to store the necessary information to sustain our identity
broker. In this EER there are two type of possible data to access the CARDIO and the
GPS. Both of them have the TStamp (time stamp) field to keep a temporal coherence
and the AccuracyLevel to determine the level of precision of the information that was
fulfilled by the attribute authority. (e.g. There are several methods to obtain a GPS
coordinate however some methods are more precisely than others). The DEVICE
table holds the users’ attribute authorities and their supported data in the table
DEVICEDATA.
Figure A.2: Identity Broker Database EER
A.2 Attribute Authority standalone application
The Attribute Authority (AA) standalone application was developed on Java SE 6
and ported to Android smartphones in order to transform these devices into AAs.
The libraries employed for the android port were:
• Android SDK (API 10) provides the necessary API libraries and developer
tools to build, test, and debug applications for Android devices.
– Website: http://developer.android.com/sdk/index.html
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– Version: 20.0.3
– Download link: http://dl.google.com/android/android-sdk r20.0.3-linux.tgz
• asmack is a Java open source XMPP client library for instant messaging and
presence based on the Smack API from Ignite Realtime for android.
– Website: https://code.google.com/p/asmack/
– Version: issue15
– Download link: https://asmack.googlecode.com/files/asmack-issue15.jar
• ZXing to create the right means for the Attribute Authority android application
read the QR codes for their enrollment process.
Figure A.3 shows the AA package tree that is composed by three packages:
Figure A.3: AA Android package tree
(1) The com.google.zxing.integrator is re-
sponsible to establish the right means to
read the QR codes, this package is part
of the ZXing library.
(2) The org.ofelia.aa that contains three
classes responsible for the AA core im-
plementation: (a) The AA.java that
holds the main methods for the AA
implementation, methods like the token
management and data management; (b)
the RequestReceiver.java implements a
service that waits for a specific SMS that
requests the smartphone to turn on its
internet and the main application when
requested; and (c) the XmppChatActiv-
ity.java that is responsible to construct
the mobile program interface and manage
the XMPP connections.
(3) The org.ofelia.common that contains the common classes used in android every
time an application is being developed for OFELIA. This package contains five classes:
(a) the Common.java, holds the generic methods like math or print methods; (b)
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Constants.java like its own name suggests it stores the application program constants;
(c) The DataBaseHelper.java handles the necessary SQL functions to read and write
the AA database; (d,e) the classes XmppHandler.java and XMPPmessageListener.java
work exactly like in the identity broker web service (see A.1).
Figure A.4 represents the Attribute Authority EER database model. This database
has several similarities with the identity broker database. The table USER is used to
represent the requesters.
Figure A.4: Attribute Authority Database EER
A.3 Secure Digital Wallet application
The Secure Digital Wallet application is a pure android application.
The libraries employed for this android application were:
• Android SDK (API 10) to provides the necessary API libraries and developer
tools to developed our application.
• asmack used to establish the XMPP connections.
• ZXing library in order to consume the QR codes.
Figure A.5 presents the Digital Wallet application package tree. This android appli-
cation for smartphones is composed by three different packages:
(1,2) The packages com.google.zxing.inte- gration and org.ofelia.common are the same
from the Attribute Authority android application. (see A.3)
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(3) The package org.ofelia.wallet implements the core functions of this android ap-
plication and is composed by four classes: (a) The FirstTimeView.java is an android
activity that appear only once at the first time the user opens the application in order
obtain the necessary information to deploy the application (a XMPP account and a
PIN);
Figure A.5: Digital wallet Android
package tree
(b) The QRAndroidActivity.java is the
android activity that allows the QR code
enrollment process; (c) The class Re-
questedReceiver.java implements a SMS
service already explained on the At-
tribute Authority standalone application
(see A.3; and (d) the XmppChat.java
is the main class on this application
since defines the interface, establish the
communication and handles the process
of authorization.
Figure A.6 represents the digital wallet
EER database model. This database
has several similarities with the identity
broker database. However there is no
data tables (like GPS) since the digital
wallet is not a consumer or producer of
data information. The DEVICE table
is used to store the users’ AAs informa-
tion.
A.4 Relying Party web service
Despite the fact that we have developed an API for already running relying parties
we developed our own Relying Party (RP) web service in order to evaluate our
architecture. This web service was developed in Oracle Java SE 7 by the usage of
the Java development kit (JDK) and deployed on the Apache Tomcat Servlet/JSP
container version 7.
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Figure A.6: Secure digital wallet Database EER
The libraries employed for the implementation were:
• Apache Xerces2 Java used to parsing, validating and manipulating XML
documents.
• Openid4java employed as a consumer of OpenID identity
• MySQL Connector/J to establish connection between a MySQL database and
the web service.
Figure A.7: Relying party package tree
Figure A.7 shows the relying party web
service package tree. This figure is
formed by three groups of packages:
(1) The org.ofelia is composed by just
one class, the core.java responsible to
handle and redirect all the relying parties
HTTP requests, this class acts as the RP
backbone.
(2) The org.ofelia.handler is composed
by two classes: (i) The DBHandler.java
and the XmlHandler.java both already
described in the Identity Broker (see A.1)
(3) The org.ofelia.servlets is composed
by three servlets that are invoked by
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an OFELIA JavaServer Page (JSP). These servlets are: (i) dataVisualizer.java
responsible to analysis the data types received in order to give the best data output
view for the requester (at the moment only recognizes the GPS data that is represented
as coordinates on google maps); (ii) the login.java to handle the user registration and
login process by the usage of an OpenID server; (iii) and the requestTokenData is used
to request new data accesses to the Identity Broker.
Figure A.8 represents the Relying Party EER database model. In this database the
table USER holds information only about the data consumers. The table TOKEN
and TOKENDATA holds information for data consumption such as the type of data,
their expire date and the jabber address contact from the requested user.
Figure A.8: Relying Party Database EER
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A.5 Screen captures:
Figure A.9: Ofelia digital wallet authorization request box.
Figure A.10: Ofelia digital wallet token list.
Figure A.11: Relying Party user area.
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Figure A.12: Relying Party data request page.
Figure A.13: Relying Party GPS coordinate consultation.
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